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ABSTRACT
This survey paper categorises, compares, and summarises from 
almost all published technical and review articles in automated 
fraud detection within the last 10 years. It defines the professional
fraudster, formalises the main types and subtypes of known fraud,
and presents the nature of data evidence collected within affected 
industries. Within the business context of mining the data to 
achieve higher cost savings, this research presents methods and 
techniques together with their problems. Compared to all related 
reviews on fraud detection, this survey covers much more 
technical articles and is the only one, to the best of our 
knowledge, which proposes alternative data and solutions from 
related domains.
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1. INTRODUCTION & MOTIVATION
Data mining is about finding insights which are statistically 
reliable, unknown previously, and actionable from data (Elkan, 
2001). This data must be available, relevant, adequate, and clean.
Also, the data mining problem must be well-defined, cannot be
solved by query and reporting tools, and guided by a data mining 
process model (Lavrac et al, 2004). 
The term fraud here refers to the abuse of a profit organisation’s 
system without necessarily leading to direct legal consequences.
In a competitive environment, fraud can become a business 
critical problem if it is very prevalent and if the prevention
procedures are not fail-safe. Fraud detection, being part of the 
overall fraud control, automates and helps reduce the manual parts 
of a screening/checking process. This area has become one of the 
most established industry/government data mining applications. 
It is impossible to be absolutely certain about the legitimacy of 
and intention behind an application or transaction. Given the 
reality, the best cost effective option is to tease out possible 
evidences of fraud from the available data using mathematical 
algorithms. 
Evolved from numerous research communities, especially those 
from developed countries, the analytical engine within these 
solutions and software are driven by artificial immune systems, 
artificial intelligence, auditing, database, distributed and parallel 
computing, econometrics, expert systems, fuzzy logic, genetic 
algorithms, machine learning, neural networks, pattern 
recognition, statistics, visualisation and others. There are plenty of 
specialised fraud detection solutions and software1 which protect
businesses such as credit card, e-commerce, insurance, retail, 
telecommunications industries. 
There are often two main criticisms of data mining-based fraud 
detection research: the dearth of publicly available real data to 
perform experiments on; and the lack of published well-
researched methods and techniques. To counter both of them, this 
paper garners all related literature for categorisation and 
comparison, selects some innovative methods and techniques for 
discussion; and points toward other data sources as possible 
alternatives.
 The primary objective of this paper is to define existing 
challenges in this domain for the different types of large data 
sets and streams. It categorises, compares, and summarises 
relevant data mining-based fraud detection methods and 
techniques in published academic and industrial research. 
 The second objective is to highlight promising new directions 
from related adversarial data mining fields/applications such 
as epidemic/outbreak detection, insider trading, intrusion 
detection, money laundering, spam detection, and terrorist 
detection. Knowledge and experience from these adversarial 
domains can be interchangeable and will help prevent 
repetitions of common mistakes and “reinventions of the 
wheel”.
Section 2 – Who are the white collar criminals which a fraud 
detection system should be designed to discover? Where can one 
apply data mining techniques to commercial fraud? Section 3 –
What data is available for fraud detection? Which performance 
measurements are appropriate for analysis? Section 4 – Which 
techniques often used for automated fraud detection? What
combinations of techniques have been recommended? What are 
their weaknesses? Sections 5 – What analytical methods and 
techniques from other adversarial domains can one apply in fraud 
detection? Section 6 – How is this fraud detection survey different 
from others? Section 7 concludes with a brief summary.
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22. BACKGROUND
This section highlights the types of fraudsters and affected 
industries.
2.1 Fraudsters
Figure 2.1: Hierarchy chart of white-collar crime perpetrators from both
firm-level and community-level perspectives. 
With reference to figure 2.1, the profit-motivated fraudster has 
interactions with the affected business. Traditionally, each 
business is always susceptible to internal fraud or corruption from 
its management (high-level) and non-management employees
(low-level). In addition to internal and external audits for fraud 
control, data mining can also be utilised as an analytical tool.
From figure 1, the fraudster can be an external party, or parties. 
Also, the fraudster can either commit fraud in the form of a 
prospective/existing customer (consumer) or a 
prospective/existing supplier (provider). The external fraudster 
has three basic profiles: the average offender, criminal offender, 
and organised crime offender. Average offenders display random 
and/or occasional dishonest behaviour when there is opportunity, 
sudden temptation, or when suffering from financial hardship. 
In contrast, the more risky external fraudsters are individual 
criminal offenders and organised/group crime offenders
(professional/career fraudsters) because they repeatedly disguise 
their true identities and/or evolve their modus operandi over time 
to approximate legal forms and to counter detection systems.  
Therefore, it is important to account for the strategic interaction, 
or moves and countermoves, between a fraud detection system’s 
algorithms and the professional fraudsters’ modus operandi. It is 
probable that internal and insurance fraud is more likely to be 
committed by average offenders; credit and telecommunications 
fraud is more vulnerable to professional fraudsters.
For many companies where they have interactions with up to 
millions of external parties, it is cost-prohibitive to manually 
check the majority of the external parties’ identities and activities.
So the riskiest ones determined through data mining output such 
as suspicion scores, rules, and visual anomalies will be 
investigated.
2.2 Affected Commercial Industries
Figure 2.2: Bar chart of fraud types from 51 unique and published fraud 
detection papers. The most recent publication is used to represent previous 
similar publications by the same author(s).
Figure 2.2 details the subgroups of internal, insurance, credit card, 
and telecommunications fraud detection. Internal fraud detection 
is concerned with determining fraudulent financial reporting by 
management (Lin et al, 2003; Bell and Carcello, 2000; Fanning 
and Cogger, 1998; Summers and Sweeney, 1998; Beneish, 1997; 
Green and Choi, 1997), and abnormal retail transactions by 
employees (Kim et al, 2003). There are four subgroups of 
insurance fraud detection: home insurance (Bentley, 2000; Von 
Altrock, 1997), crop insurance (Little et al, 2002), automobile 
insurance (Phua et al, 2004; Viaene et al, 2004; Brockett et al, 
2002; Stefano and Gisella, 2001; Belhadji et al, 2000; Artis et al, 
1999), and medical insurance (Yamanishi et al, 2004; Major and 
Riedinger, 2002; Williams, 1999; He et al, 1999; Cox, 1995). 
Credit fraud detection refers to screening credit applications 
(Wheeler and Aitken, 2000), and/or logged credit card 
transactions (Fan, 2004; Chen et al, 2004; Chiu and Tsai, 2004; 
Foster and Stine, 2004; Kim and Kim, 2002; Maes et al, 2002; 
Syeda et al, 2002; Bolton and Hand, 2001; Bentley et al, 2000; 
Brause et al, 1999; Chan et al, 1999; Aleskerov et al, 1997; 
Dorronsoro et al, 1997; Kokkinaki, 1997; Ghosh and Reilly, 
1994). Similar to credit fraud detection, telecommunications 
subscription data (Cortes et al, 2003; Cahill et al, 2002; Moreau 
and Vandewalle, 1997; Rosset et al, 1999), and/or wire-line and 
wire-less phone calls (Kim et al, 2003; Burge and Shawe-Taylor, 
2001; Fawcett and Provost, 1997; Hollmen and Tresp, 1998; 
Moreau et al, 1999; Murad and Pinkas, 1999; Taniguchi et al, 
1998; Cox, 1997; Ezawa and Norton, 1996) are monitored.
Credit transactional fraud detection has received the most 
attention from researchers although it has been loosely used here 
to include bankruptcy prediction (Foster and Stine, 2004) and bad 
debts prediction (Ezawa and Norton, 1996). Employee/retail (Kim 
et al, 2003), national crop insurance (Little et al, 2002), and credit 
application (Wheeler and Aitken, 2000) each has only one
academic publication.
The main purpose of these detection systems is to identify general 
trends of suspicious/fraudulent applications and transactions. In 
the case of application fraud, these fraudsters apply for insurance 
entitlements using falsified information, and apply for credit and
telecommunications products/services using non-existent identity 
information or someone else’s identity information. In the case of 
transactional fraud, these fraudsters take over or add to the usage 




3There are other fraud detection domains. E-businesses and e-
commerce on the Internet present a challenging data mining task
because it blurs the boundaries between fraud detection systems 
and network intrusion detection systems. Related literature focus 
on video-on-demand websites (Barse et al, 2003) and IP-based 
telecommunication services (McGibney and Hearne, 2003). 
Online sellers (Bhargava et al, 2003) and online buyers (Sherman, 
2002) can be monitored by automated systems. Fraud detection in 
government organisations such as tax (Bonchi et al, 1999) and 
customs (Shao et al, 2002) has also been reported.
3. DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
This section discusses the types of available data and previously 
used performance measures.
3.1 Structured data
This subsection aims to define the attributes and examples which 
have been used for previous fraud detection experimental studies 
and actual systems. By doing so, future studies on fraud detection 
will find this useful to either validate their real data or create 
synthetic data.
Figure 3.1: Scatter plot of the data size from 40 unique and published 
fraud detection papers within common fraud types.
Figure 3.1 shows the number of original attributes (vertical axis) 
and pre-sampled examples (horizontal axis) from internal, 
insurance, credit card, and telecommunications fraud detection 
literature.
Generally, attributes can be binary, numerical (interval or ratio 
scales), categorical (nominal or ordinal scales), or a mixture of the 
three. 16 data sets have less than 10 attributes, 18 data sets have 
between 10 to 49 attributes, 5 data sets have between 50 to 99 
attributes, and only 1 data set used more than 100 attributes
(Wheeler and Aitken, 2000).
Management data sets are the smallest (all have less than 500 
examples), except for employee/retail data with more than 5 
million transactions (Kim et al, 2003). Insurance data sets consist 
of hundreds of examples and the largest contain 40000 examples
(Williams, 1999). Most credit transactional data have more than 1 
million transactions and the largest contain more than 12 million 
transactions per year (Dorronsoro et al, 1997).
Telecommunications data are the largest because they comprise of 
transactions generated by hundreds, thousands, or millions of 
accounts. The largest reported is produced by at least 100 million 
telecommunications accounts (Cortes et al, 2003).
Figure 3.2: Scatter plot of the percentage of fraud and percentage of test 
of entire data set. 19 unique and published fraud detection papers within 
common fraud types were used. 
Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of fraud (vertical axis) and 
percentage of test examples (horizontal axis) of the entire data set 
described in each study.
Six studies using credit transactional and insurance data have less 
than 10 percent fraud. In particular, Foster and Stine (2004) and 
Bentley (2000) have as low as 0.1 percent fraud in credit 
transactional data and 0.5 percent fraud in home insurance data
respectively. More than 80 percent (16 papers) of the 19 papers 
has skewed data with less than 30% fraud. The average of the 
proportion of test examples to total examples of the 19 papers is 
around 50%.
The specific attributes used for detecting each fraud type are 
generally the same. Management data are typically financial ratios 
using accounts receivable, allowance of doubtful debts, and net 
sales figures. Crop insurance data consist of ratios using amount 
of compensation, premium, and liability figures (Little et al, 
2002). Home insurance data is made up of customer behaviour
(current claim amount, time as customer, past claims) and 
financial status (annual income, average bank balance, number of 
overdrafts) (Von Altrock, 1995). Automobile insurance data are 
usually binary indicators grouped into accident, claimant, driver, 
injury, treatment, lost wages, vehicle, and other categories.
Medical insurance data can comprise of patient demographics 
(age and gender), treatment details (services), and policy and 
claim details (benefits and amount) (Williams, 1999).
Specific attributes in credit transaction data are often not revealed 
but they should comprise of date/time stamps, current transaction
(amount, geographical location, merchant industry code and 
validity code), transactional history, payment history, and other 
account information (age of account) (Chan et al, 1999; Ghosh 
and Reilly, 1994).
Telecommunications data can comprise of individual call 
information (date/time stamps, source number, destination 
number, call duration, type of call, geographical origin, 
geographical destination) (Cortes et al, 2003; Fawcett and 
Provost, 1997) and account summary information (likely payment 
methods, average monthly bill, average time between calls, daily
and weekly summaries of individual calls) (Cahill et al, 2002; 
Taniguchi et al, 1998).
Apart from date/time attributes in Kim et al (2003) on 
employee/retail fraud and day/week/month/year attributes in Phua 
et al (2004)  on automobile insurance fraud, the data collected to 
detect internal and insurance fraud are static and do not provide 
4any temporal information. Not only does insurance (pathology 
provider) data described in Yamanishi et al (2004) lack temporal 
information, the other attributes such as proportion of tests 
performed are not effective for fraud detection.
Almost all the data has been de-identified, apart from Wheeler and 
Aitken (2000) which describes the use of identity information 
such as names and addresses from credit applications. While most 
telecommunication account data are behavioural, Rosset et al
(1999) includes de-identified demographic data such as age and 
ethnicity for the telecommunications customer.
There are no publicly available data sets for studying fraud 
detection, except for a relatively small automobile insurance data 
set used in Phua et al (2004). And obtaining real data from 
companies for research purposes is extremely hard due to legal 
and competitive reasons. To circumvent these data availability 
problems and work on a particular fraud type, one alternative is to 
create synthetic data which matches closely to actual data. Barse 
et al (2003) justifies that synthetic data can train and adapt a 
system without any data on known frauds, variations of known 
fraud and new frauds can be artificially created, and to benchmark 
different systems. In addition, they summarised important 
qualities which should be in simulated data and proposed a five-
step synthetic data generation methodology.
Barse et al (2003) reported that use of simulated data had mixed
results when applied to real data. Three out of the 51 papers 
presented in Figure 2.2 used simulated data but the credit 
transaction data was either not realistic (Chen et al, 2004; 
Aleskerov et al, 1997) or the insurance data and results were not 
explained (Pathak et al, 2003).
The next alternative, according to Fawcett (2003), is to mine
email data for spam because researchers can study many of the 
same data issues as fraud detection and the spam data is available 
publicly in large quantities. In contrast to the structured data 
collected for fraud detection, unstructured email data will require 
effective feature selection or text processing operations.
3.2 Performance Measures
Most fraud departments place monetary value on predictions to
maximise cost savings/profit and according to their policies. They 
can either define explicit cost (Phua et al, 2004; Chan et al, 1999; 
Fawcett and Provost, 1997) or benefit models (Fan et al, 2004; 
Wang et al, 2003). 
Cahill et al (2002) suggests giving a score for an instance (phone 
call) by determining the similarity of it to known fraud examples 
(fraud styles) divided by the dissimilarity of it to known legal 
examples (legitimate telecommunications account).
Most of the fraud detection studies using supervised algorithms 
since 2001 have abandoned measurements such as true positive 
rate (correctly detected fraud divided by actual fraud) and 
accuracy at a chosen threshold (number of instances predicted 
correctly, divided by the total number of instances). In fraud 
detection, misclassification costs (false positive and false negative 
error costs) are unequal, uncertain, can differ from example to 
example, and can change over time. In fraud detection, a false 
negative error is usually more costly than a false positive error. 
Regrettably, some recent studies on credit card transactional fraud 
(Chen et al, 2004) and telecommunications superimposed fraud 
(Kim et al, 2003) still aim to only maximise accuracy. Some use 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis (true positive 
rate versus false positive rate).
Apart from Viaene et al (2004), no other fraud detection study on 
supervised algorithms has sought to maximise Area under the 
Receiver Operating Curve (AUC) and minimise cross entropy 
(CXE). AUC measures how many times the instances have to be 
swapped with their neighbours when sorting data by predicted 
scores; and CXE measures how close predicted scores are to 
target scores. In addition, Viaene et al (2004) and Foster and 
Stine (2004) seek to minimise Brier score (mean squared error of 
predictions). Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil (2004) argues that the 
most effective way to assess supervised algorithms is to use one 
metric from threshold, ordering, and probability metrics; and they 
justify using the average of mean squared error, accuracy, and 
AUC. Fawcett and Provost (1999) recommend Activity 
Monitoring Operating Characteristic (AMOC) (average score 
versus false alarm rate) suited for timely credit transactional and 
telecommunications superimposition fraud detection.
For semi-supervised approaches such as anomaly detection, Lee 
and Xiang (2001) propose entropy, conditional entropy, relative 
conditional entropy, information gain, and information cost. For 
unsupervised algorithms, Yamanishi et al (2004) used the 
Hellinger and logarithmic scores to find statistical outliers for 
insurance; Burge and Shawe-Taylor (2001) employed Hellinger 
score to determine the difference between short-term and long-
term profiles for the telecommunications account. Bolton and 
Hand (2001) recommends the t-statistic as a score to compute the 
standardised distance of the target account with centroid of the 
peer group; and also to detect large spending changes within 
accounts.
Other important considerations include how fast the frauds can be 
detected (detection time/time to alarm), how many styles/types of 
fraud detected, whether the detection was done in online/real time 
(event-driven) or batch mode (time-driven) (Ghosh and Reilly, 
1994).
There are problem-domain specific criteria in insurance fraud 
detection. To evaluate automated insurance fraud detection, some 
domain expert comparisons and involvement have been described. 
Von Altrock (1995) claimed that their algorithm performed 
marginally better than the experienced auditors. Brockett et al
(2002) and Stefano and Gisella (2001) summed up their 
performance as being consistent with the human experts and their 
regression scores. Belhadji et al (2000) stated that both automated 
and manual methods are complementary. Williams (1999) 
supports the role of the fraud specialist to explore and evolve 
rules. NetMap (2004) reports visual analysis of insurance claims 
by the user helped discover the fraudster.
54. METHODS AND TECHNIQUES
This section examines four major methods commonly used, and 
their corresponding techniques and algorithms.
4.1 Overview
Figure 4.1: Structured diagram of the possible data for analysis. Data 
mining approaches can utilise training/testing data with labels, only legal 
examples, and no labels to predict/describe the evaluation data.
Figure 4.1 shows that many existing fraud detection systems 
typically operate by adding fraudulent claims/applications/ 
transactions/accounts/sequences (A) to “black lists” to match for 
likely frauds in the new instances (E). Some use hard-coded rules 
which each transaction should meet such as matching addresses 
and phone numbers, and price and amount limits (Sherman, 
2002). 
An interesting idea borrowed from spam (Fawcett, 2003, p144, 
figure 5) is to understand the temporal nature of fraud in the 
“black lists” by tracking the frequency of terms and category of 
terms (style or strategy of fraudster) found in the attributes of 
fraudulent examples over time. Below outlines the complex nature 
of data used for fraud detection in general (Fawcett, 2003; 1997):
 Volume of both fraud and legal classes will fluctuate 
independently of each other; therefore class distributions 
(proportion of illegitimate examples to legitimate examples)
will change over time.
 Multiple styles of fraud can happen at around the same time. 
Each style can have a regular, occasional, seasonal, or once-
off temporal characteristic. 
 Legal characteristics/behaviour can change over time.
 Within the near future after uncovering the current modus 
operandi of professional fraudsters, these same fraudsters will 
continually supply new or modified styles of fraud until the 
detection systems start generating false negatives again.
With reference to Figure 4.1, the common data mining approaches 
to determine the most suspicious examples from the incoming 
data stream (evaluation data) are:
1) Labelled training data (A + B + C + D) can be processed by 
single supervised algorithms (Section 4.2). A better suggestion is 
to employ hybrids such as multiple supervised algorithms (Section 
4.3.1), or both supervised and unsupervised algorithms (Section 
4.3.2) to output suspicion scores, rules and/or visual anomalies on 
evaluation data. 
2) All known legal claims/applications/transactions/accounts/ 
sequences (C) should be used processed by semi-supervised
algorithms to detect significant anomalies from consistent normal 
behaviour (Section 4.4).
However, there are many criticisms with using labelled data to 
detect fraud:
 In an operational event-driven environment, the efficiency of 
processing is critical. 
 The length of time needed to flag examples as fraudulent will 
be the same amount of time the new fraud types will go 
unnoticed. 
 The class labels of the training data can be incorrect and
subject to sample selectivity bias (Hand, 2004). 
 They can be quite expensive and difficult to obtain (Brockett, 
2002). 
 Staffs have to manually label each example and this has the 
potential of breaching privacy particularly if the data contains 
identity and personal information. 
 Dorronsoro et al (1997) recommend the use of unlabelled data 
because the fraudster will try to make fraud and legal classes 
hard to distinguish. 
Therefore it is necessary to:
3) Combine training data (the class labels are not required here) 
with evaluation data (A + C + E + F). These should be processed 
by single or multiple unsupervised algorithms to output suspicion 
scores, rules and/or visual anomalies on evaluation data (Section 
4.5). 
4.2 Supervised Approaches on Labelled 
Data (A + B + C + D)
Predictive supervised algorithms examine all previous labelled 
transactions to mathematically determine how a standard 
fraudulent transaction looks like by assigning a risk score 
(Sherman, 2002). Neural networks are popular and support vector 
machines (SVMs) have been applied. Ghosh and Reilly (1994) 
used a three-layer, feed-forward Radial Basis Function (RBF) 
neural network with only two training passes needed to produce a 
fraud score in every two hours for new credit card transactions. 
Barse et al (2003) used a multi-layer neural network with 
exponential trace memory to handle temporal dependencies in 
synthetic Video-on-Demand log data. Syeda et al (2002) propose 
fuzzy neural networks on parallel machines to speed up rule 
production for customer-specific credit card fraud detection. Kim 
et al (2003) proposes SVM ensembles with either bagging and 
boosting with aggregation methods for telecommunications 
subscription fraud.
The neural network and Bayesian network comparison study 
(Maes et al, 2002) uses the STAGE algorithm for Bayesian 
networks and backpropagation algorithm for neural networks in 
credit transactional fraud detection. Comparative results show that 
Bayesian networks were more accurate and much faster to train, 
but Bayesian networks are slower when applied to new instances. 
Ezawa and Norton (1996) developed Bayesian network models in 
four stages with two parameters. They argue that regression, 














6trees have difficulties with certain discrete variables. The model 
with most variables and with some dependencies performed best
for their telecommunications uncollectible debt data. 
Viaene et al (2004) applies the weight of evidence formulation of 
AdaBoosted naive Bayes (boosted fully independent Bayesian 
network) scoring. This allows the computing of the relative 
importance (weight) for individual components of suspicion and 
displaying the aggregation of evidence pro and contra fraud as a 
balance of evidence which is governed by a simple additivity 
principle. Compared to unboosted and boosted naive Bayes, the 
framework showed slightly better accuracy and AUC but clearly 
improved on the cross entropy and Brier scores. It is also readily 
accessible and naturally interpretable decision support and allows 
for flexible human expert interaction and tuning on an automobile 
insurance dataset.
Decision trees, rule induction, and case-based reasoning have also 
been used. Fan (2004) introduced systematic data selection to 
mine concept-drifting, possibly insufficient, data streams. The 
paper proposed a framework to select the optimal model from four 
different models (based on old data chunk only, new data chunk 
only, new data chunk with selected old data, and old and new data 
chunks). The selected old data is the examples which both optimal 
models at the consecutive time steps predict correctly. The cross-
validated decision tree ensemble is consistently better than all 
other decision tree classifiers and weighted averaging ensembles
under all concept-drifting data chunk sizes, especially when the 
new data chunk size of the credit card transactions are small. With 
the same credit card data as Fan (2004), Wang et al (2003) 
demonstrates a pruned classifier C4.5 ensemble which is derived 
by weighting each base classifier according to its expected 
benefits and then averaging their outputs. The authors show that 
the ensemble will most likely perform better than a single 
classifier which uses exponential weighted average to emphasise 
more influence on recent data. 
Rosset et al (1999) presents a two-stage rules-based fraud 
detection system which first involves generating rules using a 
modified C4.5 algorithm. Next, it involves sorting rules based on 
accuracy of customer level rules, and selecting rules based on 
coverage of fraud of customer rules and difference between 
behavioural level rules. It was applied to a telecommunications 
subscription fraud. Bonchi et al (1999) used boosted C5.0 
algorithm on tax declarations of companies. Shao et al (2002)
applied a variant of C4.5 for customs fraud detection.
Case-based reasoning (CBR) was used by Wheeler and Aitken 
(2000) to analyse the hardest cases which have been misclassified
by existing methods and techniques. Retrieval was performed by 
thresholded nearest neighbour matching.  Diagnosis utilised 
multiple selection criteria (probabilistic curve, best match, 
negative selection, density selection, and default) and resolution 
strategies (sequential resolution-default, best guess, and combined 
confidence) which analysed the retrieved cases. The authors 
claimed that CBR had 20% higher true positive and true negative 
rates than common algorithms on credit applications.  
Statistical modelling such as regression has been extensively 
utilised. Foster and Stine (2004) use least squares regression and 
stepwise selection of predictors to show that standard statistical 
methods are competitive. Their version of fully automatic 
stepwise regression has three useful modifications: firstly, 
organises calculations to accommodate interactions; secondly, 
exploits modern decision-theoretic criteria to choose predictors; 
thirdly, conservatively estimate p-values to handle sparse data and 
a binary response before calibrating regression predictions. If cost 
of false negative is much higher than a false positive, their 
regression model obtained significantly lesser misclassification 
costs than C4.5 for telecommunications bankruptcy prediction. 
Belhadji et al (2000) chooses the best indicators (attributes) of 
fraud by first querying domain experts, second calculating 
conditional probabilities of fraud for each indicator and third 
Probit regressions to determine most significant indicators. The 
authors also use Prohit regressions to predict fraud and adjusts the 
threshold to suit company fraud policy on automobile property 
damages. Artis et al (1999) compares a multinomial logit model 
(MNL) and nested multinomial logit model (NMNL) on a 
multiclass classification problem. Both models provide estimated 
conditional probabilities for the three classes but NMNL uses the 
two step estimation for its nested choice decision tree. It was 
applied to automobile insurance data. Mercer (1990) described
least-squares stepwise regression analysis for anomaly detection 
on aggregated employee’s applications data. 
Other techniques include expert systems, association rules, and 
genetic programming. Expert systems have been applied to 
insurance fraud. Major and Riedinger (2002) have implemented 
an actual five-layer expert system in which expert knowledge is 
integrated with statistical information assessment to identify 
medical insurance fraud. Pathak et al (2003), Stefano and Gisella
(2001) and Von Altrock (1997) have experimented on fuzzy 
expert systems. Deshmukh and Talluru (1997) applied an expert 
system to management fraud. Chiu and Tsai (2004) introduce a 
Fraud Patterns Mining (FPM) algorithm, modified from Apriori, 
to mine a common format for fraud-only credit card data. Bentley 
(2000) uses genetic programming with fuzzy logic to create rules 
for classifying data. This system was tested on real home 
insurance claims (Bentley, 2000) and credit card transaction data
(Bentley et al, 2000). None of these papers on expert systems, 
association rules, and genetic programming provide any direct 
comparisons with the many other available methods and 
techniques. 
The above supervised algorithms are conventional learning 
techniques which can only process structured data from single 1-
to-1 data tables. Further research using labelled data in fraud 
detection can benefit from applying relational learning approaches 
such as Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) (Muggleton and 
DeRaedt, 1994) and simple homophily-based classifiers (Provost 
et al, 2003) on relational databases. Perlich and Provost (2003) 
also present novel target-dependent aggregation methods for 
converting the relational learning problem into a conventional 
one.
4.3 Hybrid Approaches with Labelled Data
4.3.1 Supervised Hybrids (A + B + C + D)
Popular supervised algorithms such as neural networks, Bayesian 
networks, and decision trees have been combined or applied in a 
sequential fashion to improve results. Chan et al (1999) utilises
naive Bayes, C4.5, CART, and RIPPER as base classifiers and 
stacking to combine them. They also examine bridging 
incompatible data sets from different companies and the pruning 
of base classifiers. The results indicate high cost savings and 
7better efficiency on credit card transactions. Phua et al (2004) 
proposes backpropagation neural networks, naive Bayes, and C4.5
as base classifiers on data partitions derived from minority 
oversampling with replacement. Its originality lies in the use of a 
single meta-classifier (stacking) to choose the best base classifiers, 
and then combine these base classifiers’ predictions (bagging) to 
produce the best cost savings on automobile insurance claims.
Ormerod et al (2003) recommends a rule generator to refine the 
weights of the Bayesian network. Kim and Kim (2002) propose a 
decision tree to partition the input space, tanh as a weighting 
function to generate fraud density, and subsequently a 
backpropagation neural network to generate a weighted suspicion 
score on credit card transactions.
Also, He et al (1999) propose genetic algorithms to determine 
optimal weights of the attributes, followed by k-nearest neighbour 
algorithm to classify the general practitioner data. They claim 
significantly better results than without feature weights and when 
compared to CBR.
4.3.2 Supervised/Unsupervised Hybrids (A + B + C 
+ D)
There is extensive work on labelled data using both supervised 
and unsupervised algorithms in telecommunications fraud 
detection. Cortes and Pregibon (2001) propose the use of 
signatures (telecommunication account summaries) which are 
updated daily (time-driven). Fraudulent signatures are added to 
the training set and processed by supervised algorithms such as 
atree, slipper, and model-averaged regression. The authors remark 
that fraudulent toll-free numbers tend to have extensive late night 
activity and long call durations. Cortes and Pregibon (2001) use 
signatures assumed to be legitimate to detect significant changes 
in calling behaviour. Association rules is used to discover 
interesting country combinations and temporal information from 
the previous month. A graph-theoretic method (Cortes et al, 2003) 
is used to visually detect communities of interest of fraudulent 
international call accounts (see Section 4.5). Cahill et al (2002) 
assign an averaged suspicion score to each call (event-driven) 
based on its similarity to fraudulent signatures and dissimilarity to 
its account’s normal   signature.   Calls with low scores are used 
to update the signature and recent calls are weighted more heavily 
than earlier ones in the signature. 
Fawcett and Provost (1997) present fraud rule generation from 
each cloned phone account’s labelled data and rule selection to 
cover most accounts. Each selected fraud rule is applied in the 
form of monitors (number and duration of calls) to the daily 
legitimate usage of each account to find anomalies. The selected 
monitors’ output and labels on an account’s previous daily
behaviour are used as training data for a simple Linear Threshold 
Unit. An alarm will be raised on that account if the suspicion 
score on the next evaluation day exceeds its threshold. In terms of 
cost savings and accuracy, this method performed better than 
other methods such as expert systems, classifiers trained without 
account context, high usage, collision detection, velocity 
checking, and dialled digit analysis on detecting
telecommunications superimposed fraud. 
Two studies on telecommunications data show that supervised 
approaches achieve better results than unsupervised ones. With 
AUC as the performance measure, Moreau et al (1999) show that 
supervised neural network and rule induction algorithms 
outperform two forms of unsupervised neural networks which 
identify differences between short-term and long-term statistical 
account behaviour profiles. The best results are from a hybrid 
model which combines these four techniques using logistic 
regression. Using true positive rate with no false positives as the 
performance measure, Taniguchi et al (1998) claim that
supervised neural networks and Bayesian networks on labelled 
data achieve significantly better outcomes than unsupervised 
techniques such as Gaussian mixture models on each non-fraud 
user to detect anomalous phone calls.
Unsupervised approaches have been used to segment the
insurance data into clusters for supervised approaches. Williams 
and Huang (1997) applies a three step process: k-means for cluster 
detection, C4.5 for decision tree rule induction, and domain 
knowledge, statistical summaries and visualisation tools for rule 
evaluation. Williams (1999) use a genetic algorithm, instead of 
C4.5, to generate rules and to allow the domain user, such as a 
fraud specialist, to explore the rules and to allow them to evolve 
accordingly on medical insurance claims. Brockett et al (1998) 
present a similar methodology utilising the Self Organising Maps 
(SOM) for cluster detection before backpropagation neural 
networks in automobile injury claims. Cox (1995) uses an 
unsupervised neural network followed by a neuro-fuzzy 
classification system to monitor medical providers’ claims.
Unconventional hybrids include the use of backpropagation 
neural networks, followed by SOMs to analyse the classification 
results on medical providers’ claims (He et al, 1997) and RBF 
neural networks to check the results of association rules for credit 
card transactions (Brause et al, 1999).
4.4 Semi-supervised Approaches with Only 
Legal (Non-fraud) Data (C)
Kim et al (2003) implements a novel fraud detection method in 
five steps: First, generate rules randomly using association rules 
algorithm Apriori and increase diversity by a calender schema;
second, apply rules on known legitimate transaction database, 
discard any rule which matches this data; third, use remaining 
rules to monitor actual system, discard any rule which detects no 
anomalies; fourth, replicate any rule which detects anomalies by 
adding tiny random mutations; and fifth, retain the successful 
rules. This system has been and currently being tested for internal 
fraud by employees within the retail transaction processing 
system.
Murad and Pinkas (1999) use profiling at call, daily, and overall 
levels of normal behaviour from each telecommunications 
account. The common daily profiles are extracted using a 
clustering algorithm with cumulative distribution distance 
function. An alert is raised if the daily profile’s call duration, 
destination, and quantity exceed the threshold and standard 
deviation of the overall profile. Aleskerov et al (1997) experiment 
with auto-associative neural networks (one hidden layer and the 
same number of input and output neurons) on each credit card 
account’s legal transactions. Kokkinaki (1997) proposes similarity 
trees (decision trees with Boolean logic functions) to profile each 
legitimate customer’s behaviour to detect deviations from the 
norm and cluster analysis to segregate each legitimate customer’s 
credit card transactions. 
84.5 Unsupervised Approaches with 
Unlabelled Data (A + C + E + F)
Link analysis and graph mining are hot research topics in anti-
terrorism, law enforcement, and other security areas, but these 
techniques seem to be relatively under-rated in fraud detection
research. A white paper (NetMap, 2004) describes how the 
emergent group algorithm is used to form groups of tightly 
connected data and how it led to the capture of an actual elusive 
fraudster by visually analysing twelve months worth of insurance 
claims. There is a brief application description of a visual 
telecommunications fraud detection system (Cox, 1997) which 
flexibly encodes data using colour, position, size and other visual 
characteristics with multiple different views and levels. The 
intuition is to combine human detection with machine 
computation.
Cortes et al (2001) examines temporal evolution of large dynamic 
graphs’ for telecommunications fraud detection. Each graph is 
made up of subgraphs called Communities Of Interest (COI). To 
overcome instability of using just the current graph, and storage 
and weightage problems of using all graphs at all time steps; the 
authors used the exponential weighted average approach to update 
subgraphs daily. By linking mobile phone accounts using call 
quantity and durations to form COIs, the authors confirm two 
distinctive characteristics of fraudsters. First, fraudulent phone 
accounts are linked - fraudsters call each other or the same phone 
numbers. Second, fraudulent call behaviour from flagged frauds 
are reflected in some new phone accounts - fraudsters retaliate 
with application fraud/identity crime after being detected. Cortes 
et al (2003) states their contribution to dynamic graph research in 
the areas of scale, speed, dynamic updating, condensed 
representation of the graph, and measure direct interaction 
between nodes. 
Some forms of unsupervised neural networks have been applied. 
Dorronsoro et al (1997) creates a non-linear discriminant analysis 
algorithm which do not need labels. It minimises the ratio of the 
determinants of the within and between class variances of weight
projections. There is no history on each credit card account’s past 
transactions, so all transactions have to be segregated into 
different geographical locations. The authors explained that the 
installed detection system has low false positive rates, high cost 
savings, and high computational efficiency. Burge and Shawe-
Taylor (2001) use a recurrent neural network to form short-term 
and long-term statistical account behaviour profiles. Hellinger 
distance is used to compare the two probability distributions and 
give a suspicion score on telecommunications toll tickets.
In addition to cluster analysis (Section 4.3.2), unsupervised 
approaches such as outlier detection, spike detection, and other 
forms of scoring have been applied. Yamanishi et al (2004)
demonstrated the unsupervised SmartSifter algorithm which can 
handle both categorical and continuous variables, and detect 
statistical outliers using Hellinger distance, on medical insurance 
data.
Bolton and Hand (2001) recommend Peer Group Analysis to 
monitor inter-account behaviour over time. It compares the 
cumulative mean weekly amount between a target account and 
other similar accounts (peer group) at subsequent time points. The 
distance metric/suspicion score is a t-statistic which determines 
the standardised distance from the centroid of the peer group. The 
time window to calculate peer group is thirteen weeks and future 
time window is four weeks on credit card accounts. Bolton and 
Hand (2001) also suggest Break Point Analysis to monitor intra-
account behaviour over time. It detects rapid spending or sharp 
increases in weekly spending within a single account. Accounts 
are ranked by the t-test. The fixed-length moving transaction 
window contains twenty-four transactions: first twenty for training 
and next four for evaluation on credit card accounts.
Brockett et al (2002) recommends Principal Component Analysis 
of RIDIT scores for rank-ordered categorical attributes on 
automobile insurance data.
Hollmen and Tresp (1998) present an experimental real-time fraud 
detection system based on a Hidden Markov Model (HMM).
4.6 Critique of Methods and Techniques
 In most scenarios of real-world fraud detection, the choice of 
data mining techniques is more dependent on the practical 
issues of operational requirements, resource constraints, and 
management commitment towards reduction of fraud than the 
technical issues poised by the data. 
 Other novel commercial fraud detection techniques include 
graph-theoretic anomaly detection2 and Inductive Logic 
Programming3. There has not been any empirical evaluation of 
commercial data mining tools for fraud detection since Abbott 
et al (1998).
 Only seven studies claim to be implemented (or had been) as 
actual fraud detection systems: in insurance (Major and 
Riedinger, 2002; Cox, 1995), in credit card (Dorronsoro et al,
1997; Ghosh and Reilly, 1994), and in telecommunications 
(Cortes et al, 2003; Cahill et al, 2002; Cox, 1997). Few fraud 
detection studies which explicitly utilise temporal information 
and virtually none use spatial information.
 There is too much emphasis by research on complex, non-
linear supervised algorithms such as neural networks and 
support vector machines. In the long term, less complex and 
faster algorithms such as naive Bayes (Viaene et al, 2002) and 
logistic regression (Lim et al, 2000) will produce equal, if not 
better results (see Section 3.2), on population-drifting, 
concept-drifting, adversarial-ridden data. If the incoming data 
stream has to be processed immediately in an event-driven 
system or labels are not readily available, then semi-
supervised and unsupervised approaches are the only data 
mining options.
 Other related data mining techniques covered by survey 
papers and bibliographies include outlier detection (Hodge 
and Austin, 2004), skewed/imbalanced/rare classes4 (Weiss, 
2004), sampling (Domingos et al, 2002), cost sensitive 
learning5, stream mining6, graph mining (Washio and Motoda, 
2003), and scalability (Provost and Kolluri, 1999).
95. OTHER ADVERSARIAL DOMAINS
This section explains the relationship between fraud detection 
three other similar domains.
5.1 Terrorist Detection
There had been simplistic technical critiques of data mining for 
terrorist detection such as low accuracy (unacceptably high false 
positive rates in skewed data) and serious privacy violations 
(massive information requirements). To counter them, Jensen et al
(2003) recommend fixed-size clustering to generate true class 
labels and the linked structure of data. Scores are randomly drawn 
from either the negative or positive entities’ normal distributions. 
The second-round classifier averages an entity’s first-round score 
and scores of all its neighbours. To reduce false positives, results 
show that second-round classifier reduces false positive rates 
while maintaining true positive rates of first-round classifier. To 
reduce information requirements, results show moderately high 
accuracy through the use of only twenty percent of the data. 
Surveillance systems for terrorist, bio-terrorist, and chemo-
terrorist detection often depend on spatial and spatio-temporal 
data. These are unsupervised techniques highly applicable to fraud 
detection. Neill and Moore (2004) employ Kulldorff’s spatial scan 
statistic and the overlap-kd tree data structure. It efficiently finds
the most significant densities from latitude and longitude of 
patient’s home in real emergency department, and zip codes in 
retail cough and cold medication sales data. Das et al (2004) 
utilise Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) 
with Kulldorff’s spatial scan statistic on to detect artificial attacks 
from real emergency department’s spatio-temporal data.
Bio-terrorism detection aims to detect irregularities in temporal 
data. Similar to fraud detection, data has to be partially simulated 
by injecting epidemics, and performance is evaluated with 
detection time and number of false positives. Wong et al (2003) 
apply Bayesian networks to uncover simulated anthrax attacks 
from real emergency department data. Hutwagner et al (2003) 
describe the use of cumulative sum of deviations in the Early 
Aberration Reporting System (EARS). Goldenberg et al (2002) 
use time series analysis to track early symptoms of synthetic 
anthrax outbreaks from daily sales of retail medication (throat, 
cough, and nasal) and some grocery items (facial tissues, orange 
juice, and soup). Other epidemic detection papers include 
application of sliding linear regression to usage logs of doctors’ 
reference database (Heino and Toivonen, 2003) and HMMs to 
influenza time series (Rath et al, 2003).
5.2 Financial Crime Detection
Financial crime here refers to money laundering, violative trading, 
and insider trading and the following are brief application 
descriptions which correspond to each type of monitoring system
for the United States government. The Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network AI System (FAIS) (Senator et al, 1995) 
operates with an expert system with Bayesian inference engine to 
output suspicion scores and with link analysis to visually examine
selected subjects or accounts. Supervised techniques such as case-
based reasoning, nearest neighbour retrieval, and decision trees 
were seldom used due to propositional approaches, lack of clearly 
labelled positive examples, and scalability issues. Unsupervised 
techniques were avoided due to difficulties in deriving appropriate 
attributes. It has enabled effectiveness in manual investigations
and gained insights in policy decisions for money laundering. 
The National Association of Securities Dealers’ (NASD) 
Regulation Advanced Detection System (ADS) (Kirkland et al, 
1999) uses a rule pattern matcher and a sequence matcher cast in 
two- and three- dimensional visualisations to generate breaks or 
leads. The rule pattern matcher detects predefined suspicious 
behaviours; whilst the sequence matcher finds temporal 
relationships between events from market data which exists in a 
potential violation pattern. Association rules and decision trees 
are used to discover new patterns or refined rules which reflect 
behavioural changes in the marketplace. It has been successfully
used to identify and correct potential violative trading on the 
NASDAQ National Market. Senator (2000) argues that 
propositional data mining approaches are not useful for the ADS.
The Securities Observation, News Analysis, and Regulation 
(SONAR) (Goldberg et al, 2003) uses text mining, statistical 
regression, rule-based inference, uncertainty, and fuzzy matching. 
It mines for explicit and implicit relationships among the entities 
and events, all of which form episodes or scenarios with specific 
identifiers. It has been reported to be successful in generating 
breaks the main stock markets for insider trading (trading upon 
inside information of a material nature) and misrepresentation 
fraud (falsified news). 
Use of large amounts of unstructured text and web data such as 
free-text documents, web pages, emails, and SMS messages, is 
common in adversarial domains but still unexplored in fraud 
detection literature. Zhang et al (2003) presents Link Discovery 
on Correlation Analysis (LDCA) which uses a correlation measure 
with fuzzy logic to determine similarity of patterns between 
thousands of paired textual items which have no explicit links. It
comprises of link hypothesis, link generation, and link 
identification based on financial transaction timeline analysis to 
generate community models for the prosecution of money 
laundering criminals. 
Use of new relevant sources of data which can decrease detection 
time is another trend in adversarial domains which is lacking in 
fraud detection research. Donoho (2004) explores the use of C4.5 
decision tree, backwards stepwise logistic regression, neural 
networks (all learning algorithms with default parameters), expert 
systems, and k-means clustering (only on positive instances). It is 
for finding early symptoms of insider trading in option markets 
before any news release. 
5.3 Intrusion and Spam Detection
There are multiple data sources for intrusion detection and the 
common ones are at host level, network level, and user level. Otey 
et al (2003) advocates intrusion detection at the secure Network 
Interface Cards (NIC) level. Leckie and Yasinsac (2004) argue 
that in an encrypted environment, intrusion detection can utilise 
metadata at the user level. Julisch and Dacier (2002) mine 
historical alarms to reduce false positives. Shavlik and Shavlik 
(2004) monitor Windows® operating systems. Compared to fraud 
detection where many studies use real proprietary data, the 
benchmark KDD cup 1999 network intrusion detection data is 
often used. In addition, semi-real user level data are common, the 
“intrusions” are usually simulated using another user data and
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“real” part refers to normal computer usage data for each 
legitimate user.
In intrusion detection terms, misuse detection is for matching
known attacks (using A of Figure 4.1); and anomaly detection is 
for discovering unknown attacks (using C of Figure 4.1 and see 
Section 4.4). The current research in both intrusion detection and 
spam detection are on anomaly detection (semi-supervised) and 
unsupervised approaches. In intrusion detection research, the use 
of clustering to reduce data and HMMs for anomaly detection had 
been popular. Lane and Brodley (2003) detail that k-means to 
compress data and report that HMMs performed slightly better 
than instance-based learning (IBL) for semi-real user level data.
Similarly, Cho (1999) use SOM to decrease data for HMM 
modelling. The author show that multiple HMM models with 
fuzzy logic can be used to reduce false positive rates. Also, Stolfo 
et al (2001) advocate Sparse Markov Transducers. However, 
Yeung and Ding (2002) conclude that simple static approaches,
such as occurrence frequency distributions and cross entropy 
between distributions, outperform HMMs.
Other anomaly detection studies trialled with Winnow (Shavlik 
and Shavlik, 2004), RIPPER (Fan et al, 2001), Apriori (Lee et al, 
2000), frequent episodes (Julisch and Dacier, 2002; Lee et al, 
2000), attribute-oriented induction (Julisch and Dacier, 2002), 
and k-means (Sequeira and Zaki, 2002). Most studies conclude 
that anomaly detection does not perform as well as misuse 
detection. Unsupervised approaches include Hawkins et al (2002) 
and Williams et al (2002) which advocate replicator neural 
networks to detect outliers. To detect spam from the email server, 
Yoshida et al (2004) encodes email as hash-based text, and avoids 
labels through the use of document space density to find large 
volumes of similar emails. On a small sample of labelled emails, 
the authors comment that SVM is the best supervised algorithm 
but the detection time is too long for an event-driven system.
The use of game theory to model the strategic interaction between 
the system and adversary has been recently introduced into 
intrusion and spam detection research. Patcha and Park (2004) 
apply theoretical game theory to account for the interaction 
between one attacker and one node to detect intrusions from 
mobile ad hoc networks. In spam detection, Dalvi et al (2004) 
adapt game theory to automatically re-learn a cost-sensitive 
supervised algorithm given the cost-sensitive adversary’s optimal 
strategy. It defines the adversary and classifier optimal strategy by 
making some valid assumptions. Tested under different false 
positives costs, the game-theoretic naive Bayes classifier 
outperforms the conventional classifier by efficiently predicting 
no false positives with relatively low false negatives.
6. RELATED WORK
Bolton and Hand (2002) discuss techniques used in several 
subgroups within fraud detection such as credit card and 
telecommunications, and related domains such as money 
laundering and intrusion detection. Kou et al (2004) outline 
techniques from credit card, telecommunications, and intrusion 
detection. Weatherford (2002) recommends backpropagation 
neural networks, recurrent neural networks and artificial immune 
systems for fraud detection. 
This paper examines fraud detection from a practical data-
oriented, performance-driven perspective rather than the typical 
application-oriented or technique-oriented view of the three other 
recent survey papers.
In addition, this survey clearly defines the underlying technical 
problems and covers more relevant fraud types, methods, and 
techniques than any of the other survey papers. For example, 
internal fraud and the various hybrid approaches are presented 
here. Also, some criticisms of the current fraud detection field are
given and possible future contributions to data mining-based fraud 
detection from related domains are highlighted.
7. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
This survey has explored almost all published fraud detection 
studies. It defines the adversary, the types and subtypes of fraud, 
the technical nature of data, performance metrics, and the methods 
and techniques. After identifying the limitations in methods and 
techniques of fraud detection, this paper shows that this field can 
benefit from other related fields. Specifically, unsupervised 
approaches from counterterrorism work, actual monitoring 
systems and text mining from law enforcement, and semi-
supervised and game-theoretic approaches from intrusion and 
spam detection communities can contribute to future fraud 
detection research. However, Fawcett and Provost (1999) show 
that there are no guarantees when they successfully applied their 
fraud detection method to news story monitoring but 
unsuccessfully to intrusion detection. Future work will be in the 
form of credit application fraud detection.
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